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Abstract 
The leading Intelligent Design theorist William Dembski (2002) argued that the first No Free 
Lunch theorem, first formulated by Wolpert and Macready (1997), renders Darwinian 
evolution impossible. In response, Dembski‟s critics pointed out that the theorem is irrelevant 
to biological evolution. Meester (2009) agrees with this conclusion, but still thinks that the 
theorem does apply to simulations of evolutionary processes. According to Meester, the 
theorem shows that simulations of Darwinian evolution, as these are typically set in advance 
by the programmer, are teleological and therefore non-Darwinian. Therefore, Meester argues, 
they are useless in showing how complex adaptations arise in the universe. Meester uses the 
term “teleological” inconsistently, however, and we argue that, no matter how we interpret the 
term, a Darwinian algorithm does not become non-Darwinian by simulation. We show that 
the NFL theorem is entirely irrelevant to this argument, and conclude that it does not pose a 
threat to the relevance of simulations of biological evolution. 
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1. Background: No Free Lunch and Intelligent Design 
In No Free Lunch. Why specified complexity cannot be purchased without intelligence (2002), 
the leading Intelligent Design theorist William Dembski defends the position that the first 
NFL theorem prohibits the evolution of complex adaptations by Darwinian evolution. This 
theorem was first published by Wolpert and Macready in 1997, and established that no 
optimization algorithm can outperform a random search when averaged over all fitness 
functions. This finding ruled out the possibility of a universal, free-for-all algorithm that 
outperforms a random search on any fitness function. As a consequence, for an algorithm to 
perform more successfully than mere chance over a particular fitness function, the algorithm 
has to be tailored around the fitness function (Wolpert 2002). From this, Dembski concludes 
that for natural selection (which can be described as an evolutionary algorithm (Dennett 
1995), itself a kind of optimization algorithm (Wolpert and Macready 1997) to work as it is 
supposed to do, extra information about the particular fitness function is needed. Dembski 
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thinks that the search for this necessary information is even harder to accomplish than the 
original search performed by the evolutionary algorithm, which he terms the displacement 
problem. To avoid infinite regress, Dembski believes this extra „information‟ can only be 
supplied by an intelligent designer. The parameters of the environment have to be fine-tuned 
by this intelligence for natural selection to be successful.  
Dembski‟s book has met with devastating critiques. Some of Dembski‟s critics (e.g. Shallitt 
2002; Wolpert 2002) complained that his writings are so vague that it is almost impossible to 
pinpoint his actual position. Most critics, however (Häggström 2007a,b; Orr 2002; Perakh 
2002, 2003, 2004; Rosenhouse 2002; Sarkar 2007; Wein 2002a,b), have argued that the NFL 
theorem is simply irrelevant to biological evolution. Darwinian evolution is the result of 
natural selection acting over a specific fitness function; biological evolution is simply not 
concerned with averaging over all fitness functions. This means that, within this particular 
setting, nothing prevents natural selection from outperforming random search. Therefore, in 
principle the NFL theorem is applicable to evolutionary algorithms, but in reality it is of little 
concern.  
2. Ronald Meester, No Free Lunch and simulations 
Ronald Meester, a Dutch mathematician and ID sympathizer
1
, has recently subscribed to that 
particular critique in this journal: “it is simply not the case that a biological fitness function 
can be viewed as an average over all possible fitness functions. […] Therefore the NFL 
theorem simply does not apply.” (2009, p. 464) However, unlike other critics, Meester 
believes that the “algorithmic „NFL way‟ of thinking about evolution is very meaningful 
when it concerns computer simulations of certain evolutionary processes.”(2009, p. 468) 
To illustrate his own position, Meester discusses “two examples of the NFL theorem in 
action.”(2009, p. 464) Both invoke an algorithm to find a particular target, similar to the well-
known ME*THINKS*IT*IS*LIKE*A*WEASEL example by Richard Dawkins (1986). In 
that model, an algorithm combining random variation and a law of selection is shown to 
outperform mere chance in targeting this particular sequence from Shakespeare‟s Hamlet 
(Meester himself uses the word YES). Now, from the fact that this algorithm does indeed 
outperform random search, Meester infers:  
[the researcher‟s] algorithm is too efficient to be the result of averaging over all fitness 
functions; it is not likely that he chooses his fitness function uniformly at random over all 
possibilities at the start of each new search. No, it is reasonable to conclude that he uses 
the fitness function corresponding to the word YES, and that he uses the search algorithm 
associated with that word. Again, note that the conclusion is twofold: we know that he 
                                                 
1
 Meester is not an ID proponent as such, because he refuses to infer the existence of a designer. However, he 
does think that ID, and the concept of irreducible complexity in particular, “poses a serious problem to a 
Darwinist scenario”  (Meester 2003, p. 152). And he claims that “at some points, the ID movement does an 
excellent job, and on those points I have defended it. In particular, it successfully attacks the popular idea that 
evolutionary biology only needs to fill in some small gaps.” (Meester 2006, p. 296) 
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uses special fitness functions and we know that his search algorithm is tailored around his 
choice in order to get an efficient algorithm. (2009, p. 466) 
Meester thinks that this conclusion bears serious consequences for any simulation of the 
evolution of complex biological adaptations (e.g. Lenski et al. 2003). The programmer has 
selected a particular fitness function and a particular algorithm for reaching the target in 
advance. According to Meester, this makes the whole enterprise, including the algorithm, 
“intrinsically”(p. 468) or “necessarily teleological”(p. 471). No simulation, no matter how 
sophisticated, escapes this conclusion. Models of biological evolution have been set up in 
advance by a programmer. He or she selects a particular fitness function and a particular 
algorithm (i.e. random mutation and natural selection) to get at a particular goal. According to 
Meester, this makes the model automatically teleological. Darwinian evolution, by contrast, is 
non-teleological and undirected. Therefore, computer simulations cannot tell us anything 
meaningful about the nature of real-world evolution. There are, however, several difficulties 
with Meester‟s position that undermine his radical conclusion.  
3. Difficulties 
3.1. Setting a target 
Meester acknowledges that natural selection can be understood as an algorithmic search 
procedure (Meester 2009, p. 464). In evolutionary models it is exactly this algorithm of 
random variation and natural selection that is simulated. Meester, however, argues that by 
mimicking this Darwinian, non-teleological algorithm in a computer simulation it all of a 
sudden ceases to be Darwinian. But why would this be so? The mere fact that we are dealing 
with a computer simulation instead of a real-life situation is irrelevant, for algorithms are 
substrate neutral. It does not matter whether an algorithm is implemented in a biological 
environment or in a silicon-based digital one. As long as the conditions of variation, 
differential survival and heredity apply, evolution by natural selection will take place, 
irrespective of the medium. (see Dennett 1995) Thus, by itself, implementing the procedure of 
random variation and selection into a computer does not alter its non-teleological character.  
Meester  is ambiguous, however, about the precise meaning of the term “teleological”. 
Throughout the article, he applies it interchangeably and inconsistently to programs, 
simulations and algorithms and gives it at least two related, but distinct meanings. In one 
sense, “teleological” applies to the algorithm and means “being aimed at a target”. Meester 
thinks that modeling the algorithm with a preset target, makes the algorithm “intrinsically” 
teleological and, therefore, non-Darwinian. By contrast, simulations of evolution without such 
a preset target, for example for modeling bacteria resistance to antibiotics, are deemed 
unproblematic by Meester. Their point is “not to reach a special target, but instead to compare 
the „typical‟ behavior of related systems.” (p. 470) However, simply prefixing the word 
“intrinsically” to “teleological” obscures his own misunderstanding of the issue. Of course the 
programmers have a “goal” in mind, but as long as they make sure that the algorithmic 
process itself, in particular the source of variation, is undirected, this does not affect the 
validity of the simulation. Moreover, the NFL theorem is silent on the presence of targets; it 
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applies to both kind of simulations or to neither. Either way, the distinction Meester wants to 
draw between simulations with and simulations without a target cannot be made on the basis 
of the theorem.  
3.2. Built with insight into the future? 
According to Meester, not just the algorithm but the entire simulation of biological evolution 
is „teleological‟ in another sense, as it is built or programmed “with insight into the future” (p. 
470) or “the future goal”. Meester argues that programmers always make sure that the search 
algorithm in a simulation is “very carefully tailored” (p. 469) around particular fitness 
functions to get at a specific target. Meester‟s first objection concerned the presence of a 
preset target, but what bothers him here is that the simulation is designed at all. It is under this 
notion that Meester thinks he can bring in the NFL-theorem:  
So this is the conclusion that is connected to the NFL theorem (I emphasize that this 
conclusion is not part of the mathematical theorem itself): when a certain algorithm is 
efficient in combination with a (a class of) fitness function(s), then the algorithm must 
have been chosen very carefully. (p. 467) (Note that this point is independent from the 
presence of a „target‟, which is not even mentioned here by Meester.) 
Meester points out that programmers do not chose the fitness functions in the simulation “at 
random over all possibilities” (p. 466). This is unsurprising, however, because neither are 
they in the biological world. Fitness functions in real life exhibit a significant amount of what 
Häggström (2007a) terms “clustering properties”, which means that the fitness values of two 
highly similar DNA sequences are not statistically independent. In particular, “similar DNA 
sequences will tend to produce similar fitness values” (2007a, p. 228), allowing a search 
algorithm like natural selection to perform much better than blind chance. (Perakh 2004) The 
same point applies to the search algorithm itself, which is only “tailored” in the sense that it is 
specifically programmed to mirror the actual biological search algorithm, i.e. random 
variation and selection. In fact, what Meester objects to in these simulations is precisely what 
makes them successful simulations in the first place: they mimic the conditions of real life. 
Somehow, Meester thinks this only poses a problem for simulations of biological evolution: 
I do not claim – of course – that a simulation can only be meaningful if there is no design 
in the simulation. Indeed, it is impossible to simulate without designing a program. Often 
this is no problem, but if the whole point of your simulation is to show that complexity 
can arise in the universe in a Darwinian (and therefore non-teleological) way, then it does 
become a problem, since then the above discussion applies and shows that any successful 
computer program must be intrinsically teleological. (p. 471) 
Notwithstanding Meester‟s claim to the contrary, his argument is far too general. It can be 
raised against simulations of biological evolution without a preset target, but also against any 
simulation or model, of any phenomenon or in any form. If Meester‟s argument is sound, they 
would all become „teleological‟ and hence unsuited to describe purely natural processes. 
Weather forecasts, for example, are set up by intelligent humans, which would make them 
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intrinsically teleological and hence useless to talk about real weather phenomena, because the 
latter are thought of as undirected, natural processes. Unless, of course, there is a designer at 
work in the real world after all.
 
That is impossible to test, however, because, if Meester is 
right, models are necessarily and intrinsically teleological. As a consequence, Meester‟s 
argument actually immunizes teleology from falsification. Now, given the general 
implications of his critique, it makes one wonder why Meester singles out simulations of 
biological evolution as his main target. 
4. Conclusion 
The NFL theorem turns out to be completely irrelevant to Meester‟s argument against the 
usefulness of computer simulations of biological evolution. In the end, Meester‟s point is just 
that computer simulations are designed, real-life is supposed to be not designed, and therefore 
simulations cannot be used as models for the real thing. Both the first and the second premise 
are trivially true, but the conclusion does not follow. A Darwinian algorithm simply does not 
cease to be Darwinian if simulated in a computer program. By employing the term 
“teleological” in an incoherent manner and presenting his argument with a mathematical 
twist, Meester thinks he can work this magic trick. Simulations of biological evolution, 
however, are in no way threatened by the first NFL theorem.  
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